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ON CHECKBOX DIVERSITY
PHILIP LEE*
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I contest a certain definition of diversity in higher
education that was recently articulated by Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Antonin Scalia at oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas.1
This definition assumes that diversity is simply reducible to the number of
students in a college, university, graduate school, or professional program
who choose to self-identify as racial or ethnic minorities on their
applications. However, diversity based solely on checked boxes (i.e.,
"checkbox diversity") is problematic for a number of reasons.
I offer a critique of checkbox diversity, and to the extent that any higher
education admissions offices rely on checkbox diversity in making their
decisions, I provide an alternative for creating a more meaningful type of
diversity in their entering classes. Specifically, for an admissions process to
be narrowly tailored under the educational benefits rationale set forth by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the evaluation must consider how each individual
applicant would add to the diversity of perspectives in the class. Checkbox
diversity fails to meet this objective because it assumes that certain checked
boxes are proxies for different perspectives-which also assumes an
essentialist view of racial identity. It, therefore, does not go deep enough to
determine how an applicant's optional self-identification actually informs
his or her perspective.
As an alternative to this superficial measure of diversity, I contend that
admissions officers and faculty readers at institutions of higher education
should view racial and other identities as contextual and look for markers
within the application materials that demonstrate how these identities are
*Assistant Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law, University of the District of Columbia;
former Assistant Director of Admissions, Harvard Law School; Ed.D., Harvard Graduate School of
Education, 2013; Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2012; J.D., Harvard Law School,
2000; B.A., Duke University, 1996. I am thankful to Lee Coffin and Marc Johnson for their comments
on earlier drafts of this article, and to Adrienne Mundy-Shephard, Adrienne Keene, and Eddie Contreras
for stimulating discussion.
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important to an applicant who claims them.
I. FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
In Fisher v. University of Texas, a white applicant who was denied
admission to University of Texas at Austin (UT) brought an equal
protection challenge to the university's use of race in its holistic application
review process. 2 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's
decision upholding UT's race-conscious admissions policy and remanded
the case for a determination whether the university offered sufficient
evidence to prove that its policy was narrowly tailored to obtain the
educational benefits of diversity. At oral argument, on October 10, 2012,
some of the justices seemed skeptical about the prospects of UT
demonstrating narrow tailoring. Counsel for UT, Gregory G. Garre, and
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia engaged in the following
exchange:
Chief Justice Roberts: Counsel, before - I need to figure out exactly
what these numbers mean. Should someone who is one-quarter
Hispanic check the Hispanic box or some different box?
Mr. Garre: Your Honor, there is a multiracial checkbox. Students
check boxes based on their own determination.
Chief Justice Roberts: Would it violate the honor code for someone
who is one-eighth Hispanic and says, I identify as Hispanic, to check
the Hispanic box?
Mr. Garre: I don't think - I don't think it would, Your Honor...
Justice Scalia: Do they have to self-identify?
2 UT admits its students through two policies: 1) The Top Ten Percent Law, in which Texas high
school seniors in the top ten percent of their class be automatically admitted to any Texas state
university. 56 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §51.803 (West 2009); and 2) a holistic review for students not
admitted by the Top Ten Percent Law including Texas applicants who graduated outside the top ten
percent of their high schools, out-of-state residents, and international students. The holistic review
evaluates individual applicants on the basis of both an Academic Index (AI) for hard factors (i.e.,
standardized test scores and high school class rank) as well as a Personal Achievement Index (PAl) for
soft factors (i.e., content and quality of required essays, leadership, awards and honors, work
experience, extracurricular activities, and "special circumstances" including socioeconomic, family, and
racial backgrounds). Petitioner in Fisher only challenged the race-conscious evaluation of the holistic
review.
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Mr. Garre: They do not, Your Honor. Every year people do not, and
many of those applicants are admitted.
Justice Scalia: And how do they decide? You know, it's - they want
not just a critical mass in the school at large, but class by class? How
do they figure out that particular classes don't have enough? What -
are they - somebody walks in the room and looks them over to see
who looks - who looks Asian, who looks black, who looks Hispanic?
Is that - is that how it's done?
Justice Scalia: On their way in - did they require everyone to check a
box or [did] they have somebody figure out, oh, this person looks
1/32nd Hispanic, and that's enough?3
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, in their questioning, evidenced
a critical view of diversity in higher education which envisioned the
concept as having people who appear racially different sitting in the same
classroom-regardless of what perspectives they bring to the table. Hence,
their hypothetical questions focused on determining the proper racial
categories for multiracial people (i.e., how should someone who is one-
quarter, one-eighth, or one-thirty-second Hispanic identify?) to see how
they would fit into the mix. Roberts and Scalia critiqued this type of
diversity as arbitrary and unworkable-especially in light of the narrow
tailoring requirements of equal protection. This truncated conception of
diversity, however, does not capture the educational benefits of diversity
that prior cases have recognized. In particular, the most relevant inquiry in
an application evaluation should not be the checkbox itself, but how the
applicant describes the importance of the checkbox to his or her identity.
An analysis of the educational benefits of diversity rationale will make this
clear.
II. STRICT SCRUTINY AND THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS RATIONALE
The educational benefits of diversity rationale was articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in three cases that dealt with the constitutionality of
voluntary race-conscious admissions policies in public higher education:
Grutter v. Bollinger,4 Gratz v. Bollinger,5 and Regents of the University of
3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-35, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 11-345 (Oct. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/1 1-345.pdf.
4 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions
policy as both a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest).
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California v. Bakke6 (collectively "the Grutter cases"). Grutter, along with
Gratz, upheld Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke.
In Bakke, UC-Davis Medical School's race-conscious admissions policy
was challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The medical
school had two separate evaluation processes-one for general admissions
and one for special admissions targeting disadvantaged students. 7 Sixteen
of one hundred seats in the class were reserved for applicants in the special
admissions pool-and even though disadvantaged white applicants applied
for special admissions status, this program only benefitted "Blacks,
Chicanos, and Asians." 8 The Court analyzed the race-conscious admissions
program under the Equal Protection Clause using the highest level of
scrutiny (i.e., strict scrutiny). It examined two separate, but related,
questions under strict scrutiny: 1) Did the race-conscious admissions policy
at UC-Davis Medical School serve a compelling state interest?; and 2) If
the state interest was compelling, was the means chosen to further that
interest narrowly tailored? As to the first question, the Court held that race-
conscious admissions policies served a compelling state interest because of
the educational benefits associated with a diverse class.9 In the context of
UC-Davis Medical School, the Court observed, "Physicians serve a
heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified medical student with a
particular background-whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally
advantaged or disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school of
medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its
student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding
their vital service to humanity."l 0 As to the second question, under strict
scrutiny, the Court held that the dual admissions program was not narrowly
tailored-specifically, the Court noted alternative policies that UC-Davis
could have employed that were more narrowly framed to provide
individualized, holistic review (e.g., the Harvard College admissions policy
or "Harvard Plan").II Therefore, the UC-Davis race-conscious admissions
5 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down University of Michigan's undergraduate race-conscious
admissions policy as not narrowly tailored but affirming educational benefits of diversity as a
compelling state interest).
6 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down UC-Davis Medical School's race-conscious admissions
program as not narrowly tailored but affirming educational benefits of diversity as a compelling state
interest).
7 Id. at 272-76.
8 Id. at 276.
9 Id. at 314-15.
10 Idat314.
II Id. at 316-18. The Harvard Plan stated:
In recent years Harvard College has expanded the concept of diversity to include students
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policy was struck down as unconstitutional.
While Bakke upheld the educational benefits of diversity as compelling,
the Court rejected a number of other state interests proposed as additional
justifications for UC-Davis Medical School's affirmative action program
including: "(i) reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession; (ii) countering
the effects of societal discrimination; [and] (iii) increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved."12
Grutter and Gratz, in upholding Bakke, also relied on the educational
benefits of diversity as a compelling interest. The analysis contained in this
article will, therefore, be framed solely by the educational benefits
rationale. 13
In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School was faced with a
similar constitutional challenge to its race-conscious admissions policy.
The Court upheld the educational benefits rationale contained in Bakke. In
one of the clearest expressions of this rationale, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor writing for the majority observed:
As part of its goal of "assembling a class that is both exceptionally
academically qualified and broadly diverse," the Law School seeks
to "enroll a 'critical mass' of minority students." The Law School's
interest is not simply "to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race
or ethnic origin." That would amount to outright racial balancing,
which is patently unconstitutional. Rather, the Law School's
concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational
from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic groups. Harvard College now recruits not
only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and Chicanos and other minority students.
In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race has been a factor in some
admission decisions. When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of
applicants who are "admissible" and deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the
race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent
on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases. A farm boy from Idaho can bring
something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can
usually bring something that a white person cannot offer. The quality of the educational
experience of all the students in Harvard College depends in part on these differences in the
background and outlook that students bring with them.
Id at 322-23.
12 Id. at306-11.
13 The analysis under the three rationales rejected by Bakke would be different. For example, under
both a reduction of the historic deficit rationale and a countering societal discrimination rationale, the
issue would center on the inclusion of historically excluded groups-regardless of the educational
benefits of such inclusion. Further, the analysis under an underserved community rationale would center
on finding applicants who are committed to working in these communities-again, regardless of the
educational benefits that diversity creates.
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benefits that diversity is designed to produce. 14
Justice O'Connor recognized that these benefits were substantial:
As the District Court emphasized, the Law School's admissions
policy promotes "cross-racial understanding," helps to break
down racial stereotypes, and "enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races." These benefits are
"important and laudable," because "classroom discussion is
livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and
interesting" when the students have "the greatest possible variety
of backgrounds."15
Unlike the dual system struck down in Bakke, the law school evaluated
racial background as one of many factors in its "highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant's file."' 6 The race-conscious admissions
policy in Grutter was, therefore, upheld under the Equal Protection Clause
as being narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity. 17
In Gratz, the University of Michigan undergraduate admissions policy
was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the
University of Michigan practiced a form of race-conscious admissions in
which it gave all applicants from certain minority backgrounds a
predetermined number of points in the evaluation. 18 The Court affirmed the
educational benefits rationale articulated in Bakke and maintained that
diversity was a compelling government interest. 19 However, it struck down
the rigid point system holding that "because the University's use of race in
its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored -to achieve
respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 20 The race-conscious admissions policy in Gratz was,
14 Grutter, supra note 5, at 330-31 (internal citations omitted).
15 Id. at 330 (internal citations omitted). Justice O'Connor also recognized, "In order to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions
that provide this training." Id. at 333. To the extent that O'Connor expanded Bakke by creating a new
public legitimacy rationale for race-conscious admissions, I do not take issue with it. My critique,
instead, focuses on checkbox diversity as a proxy for diversity of perspective under the educational
benefits rationale.
16 Id. at 337.
17 Id. at 343.
18 Gratz, supra note 6, at 255 ("Of particular significance here, under a 'miscellaneous' category,
an applicant was entitled to 20 points [out of 150] based upon his or her membership in an
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.").
19 Id. at270-271.
20 Id. at 276.
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therefore, ruled unconstitutional. For an admissions process to be consistent
with narrow tailoring in the context of the educational benefits rationale
articulated in the Grutter cases, the evaluation must consider how the
diversity of perspectives in an entering class will enhance the educational
experience.21 Checkbox diversity fails to meet this objective because it
assumes that certain checked boxes are proxies for different perspectives. It
does not go deep enough to determine how a person's optional self-
identification informs his or her perspective.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF CHECKBOX DIVERSITY
Checkbox diversity envisions identity in essentialist terms. In other
words, it sees something essential about being a racial minority, a woman
or a gay or lesbian person that necessarily creates a minority, female, or
gay or lesbian worldview. It fails to explore the diversity of experiences
and views within groups. Under checkbox diversity, a self-identified racial
minority who has not indicated anywhere on the application why this
identify is important to her or him would, nonetheless, receive a "plus"
factor22 in the evaluation-it assumes that a different perspective simply
flows from the checkbox.
Further, checkbox diversity fails to appreciate the diversity of
perspectives that can be created by the intersection of multiple identities
(e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation). The primary concern under this
checkbox paradigm would be aesthetic-the focus would be how many
race and ethnicity checkboxes a university can publicly report at the end of
the admissions cycle, instead of how applicants who claim multiple
identities can enhance the educational experience of the class. As suggested
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia at oral argument, satisfying the
narrow tailoring prong of equal protection would be exceedingly difficult
under such a framework.
21 Note that this analysis applies to both public universities and private universities that receive
federal funding. See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 350
(4th ed. 2006) ("Because Title VI and the equal protection clause embody the same legal standards, the
Grutter and Gratz [and Bakke] principles are applicable to both public institutions and private
institutions that receive federal financial assistance.").
22 See Bakke, supra note 7, at 317-18 (holding that race could be used as a "plus" factor in an
individualized, holistic admissions process); see also Grutter, supra note 5, at 334; Gratz, supra note 6,
at 270-71.
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A. Three Dimensions of Race
Scott Page argues that there are three ways of defining race.2 3 First, it
can be defined externally or in how others see us. 24 This external definition
can also be viewed as an ascriptive category that bears an involuntary
marker of difference.2 5 Justice Scalia's questioning during the oral
argument in Fisher regarding racial categorization by who appears Asian,
black, and Hispanic is a criticism of an external definition of race for
admissions purposes. As counsel for UT Austin responded, since
admissions offices should not be ascribing racial identities to applicants
during the evaluation process based on the applicants' physical
appearances-instead it should rely on the applicants' self-reporting-the
other two definitions of race become most relevant for my analysis.
Second, race can be defined internally or in how we see ourselves. 26 The
optional racial checkboxes on an application form are an attempt to capture
this self-identification. An internal definition of race, while distinct from an
external definition because it is not imposed by others, is nonetheless
related to the external. How we see ourselves can certainly be informed by
how others see us. However, the internal definition allows the individual to
decide how she or he self-identifies.27
Third, race can be defined expressively or in how we present ourselves
to others.28 This expressive identity connects the importance of internal
identity with the applicant's actual perspective. In other words, it captures
the meaning of an applicant's internal identity, not by merely naming the
category of difference, but by illustrating the importance of this concept to
his or her life. The checkbox diversity view focuses on an applicant's
internal definition of race, while downplaying the expressive dimension.
B. The Importance of Expressive Identity
Without analyzing an applicant's expressive identity, the personal
significance of the internal definition of race cannot be measured-it can
23 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER
GRouPs, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 306 (2007).
24 Id.
25 See AMy GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 24 (2003).
26 PAGE, supra note 24, at 306.
27 Note that if the internal and external definitions of race converge for an individual, then external
identity would lose its involuntariness. On the other hand, if the internal and external definitions
diverge, then the external definition would be involuntary because it would be imposed on people who
self-identify in other ways.
28 Id.
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just be assumed. This is particularly the case where an applicant's identity
is complex; in these situations, internal, external, and expressive identities
can both conflict and overlap depending on the context. For example, a
multiracial student who primarily self-identifies as one race, while others
often see her as something different, may choose different expressive
identities depending on who she is addressing at any given time. 29 The
admissions reader will have no way of knowing this unless the applicant
presents this information in the application materials. This student's
articulation of her multi-layered expressive identity will be important for
understanding the meaning that she gives to the checkbox(es) she selects
(or the reason why she refuses to check any). The expressive aspect of
racial identity, therefore, is the most relevant for reaping the educational
benefits of a racially diverse classroom because it provides much needed
context to why the checked box has any meaning to the applicant at all. In
turn, the admissions officer can use this contextual information in crafting a
class that will maximize the educational benefits of the racial diversity
contained therein.
IV. CONTEXTUAL DIVERSITY AND NARROW TAILORING
Contextual diversity analysis moves away from essentialist conceptions
of race by viewing racial identity in its various contexts, and not as an
essentialist proxy for meaning. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who penned
the Grutter majority's opinion and who was the first woman appointed to
the U.S. Supreme Court, articulated a contextual view in a book that she
wrote as an active member of the Court.3 0 She reflected, "We all bring to
the seats of power our individual experiences and values, and part of these
depend on our gender." 31 Justice O'Connor then wrote about her struggle
to find employment after law school:
I graduated near the top of my class from one of the better law
schools in the country [i.e., Stanford]. My male classmates had
no trouble finding jobs. I interviewed with several firms in
29 See e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION (2003) (discussing "racial passing" as a type of expressive identity in various contexts);
Nancy Leong, Multiracial Identity and Affirnative Action, 12 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (2007) (noting the
unique issues that multiracial people have regarding their identities); Susan Saulny & Jacques
Steinberg, On College Forms, A Question of Race, or Races, Can Perplex, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011
(noting biracial students struggling to choose which identities to highlight and which to disregard for
purposes of college admission).
30 See generally SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (Random House Trade Paperback ed. 2004).
31 Id. at 195.
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California but received no job offers-other than... as a legal
secretary.32
Her outlook on the world was informed by her experiences as a white
woman from a leading law school who could not find employment as a law
firm associate in the early 1950s due solely to her gender. This contextual
conception of identity is different than an essentialist view. Contextual
diversity looks at the experiences of the individual to see how that person's
perspective may be different than others instead of assuming a different
perspective based on a cursory checking of a box. Justice O'Connor,
indeed, rejected the essentialist view that there are essential ways of
knowing and thinking as a woman because "it so nearly echoes the old
Victorian myth of the 'true woman'-the myth that worked so well to keep
women out of the professions for so long." 33 In its place, she argued, "This
should be our aspiration: that whatever our gender or background, we all
may become wise-wise through our different struggles and different
victories, wise through work and play, wise through profession and
family." 34 This aspiration leaves room for individual identities to inform
the diversity of perspectives in any group; however, the measure for such
diversity would be actual differences in struggles and experiences-not just
checkboxes.
Justice O'Connor also mentioned the special perspective that her
colleague on the Court for many years, Justice Thurgood Marshall, brought
to discussions regarding pending cases. She recounts:
Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal
histories and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special
perspective.. .At oral arguments and conference meetings, in
opinions and dissents, Justice Marshall imparted not only his
legal acumen but also his life experiences, constantly pushing
and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of
legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.35
O'Connor was, once again, illustrating how contextual identity can
inform the diversity of perspectives in the room. She did not rely on
essentialist identity and say that Justice Marshall, as an African
American-and by that fact alone-brought a unique perspective. 36
32 Id. at 199.
33 Id. at 192.
34 Id. at 193.
35 Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
36 Under the simplistic essentialist view, one may have mistakenly assumed that Justice Clarence
Thomas, Thurgood Marshall's successor on the Court, would have had a similar perspective to Justice
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Instead, her statement implied that Marshall, as an African American with
certain lived experiences, had "a special perspective" to present to his
colleagues.3 7 Justice O'Connor understood that not all African Americans
have the same worldview, but there was something unique in Justice
Marshall's life experience that improved the quality of the discussion
among the justices. The contextual identity articulated by O'Connor is
consistent with the educational benefits rationale in Grutter in which
classroom discussion is better because of the varied perspectives, and not
just differences in physical appearance, of the students in the room. 3 8
The perspective of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who joined with the
majority in Grutter, is also informative in terms of contextual diversity.
Shortly after graduating from Columbia Law School in 1959, Ginsburg was
refused a clerkship with Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter because
Justice Frankfurter said that he was just not ready to hire a woman.3 9
Although Justice Ginsburg was at the top of her class in law school, she
was also unable to secure a law firm job immediately after graduation.40
Informed by these early experiences, she went on to become a powerful
advocate for gender equality at the American Civil Liberties Union.41
Justice Ginsburg's unique perspective has been illustrated by her opinions
in gender rights cases, most notably the case that ended the exclusion of
women at the Virginia Military Institute.42 More recently, in Safford
Unified School District #1 v. Redding,43 Justice Ginsburg's perspective,
based on her past experiences, shaped her understanding of what
constitutes a "reasonable search." In that case, school officials strip-
searched an eighth grader, Savana Redding, based on a tip by another
Marshall-because they both happen to be African American men.
37 O'CONNOR, supra note 31, at 133.
38 Justice O'Connor also wrote, "Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique experience
of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters." Grutter,
supra note 5, at 333. Consistent with a non-essentialist view of identity, O'Connor observed that being
from a certain racial background is likely to affect someone's worldview-but she did not say it
inevitably will.
39 See Neil A. Lewis, Supreme Court: Woman in the News; Rejected as Clerk, Chosen as a Justice:
Ruth Joan Bader Gingsburg, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/l993/06/15/us/supreme-court-woman-rejected-clerk-chosen-justice-ruth-joan-
bader-ginsburg.html.
40 See Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburgand-wrp-
staff.
41 See Lewis, supra note 40.
42 See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (recognizing a heightened level of scrutiny -
i.e., "exceedingly persuasive" - for classifications based on gender).
43 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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student that Savana possessed ibuprofen in violation of a zero tolerance
drug policy at her middle school. No drugs were found. The majority
opinion in Redding, joined by Justice Ginsburg, held that Savana's Fourth
Amendment right to be secure from "unreasonable searches and seizures"
was violated when school officials searched the inside of her underwear for
what were "common pain relievers equivalent to two Advil, or one
Aleve." 44 In an interview about this case, Justice Ginsburg, stated that
based on their comments at the oral argument, some of her colleagues, all
men at the time, had failed to appreciate what Ms. Redding had been
through.45 "They have never been a 13-year-old girl," said the Justice,
adding, "It's a very sensitive age for a girl. I don't think my colleagues,
some of them, quite understood." 46 Justice Ginsberg's view on what
constitutes "reasonable" for Fourth Amendment purposes was informed by
her own experiences as a woman. She was not saying that all women
should agree with her because her perspective is the one and only women's
perspective. Instead, she was simply emphasizing that her views have been
shaped in certain ways by her own gender-based experiences.
Applying this conception of contextual identity to the higher education
application process, the admissions reader would ask how a particular
applicant will add to the diversity of the class. Bakke highlighted this type
of narrowly tailored contextual inquiry with an example:
The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for
his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race
being decisive when compared, for example, with that of an
applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is
thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial
educational pluralism. Such qualities could include exceptional
personal talents, unique work or service experience,
leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate
with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.47
Under this contextual analysis, the personal qualities of the applicant
should be what matters most-not a checkbox identity that may have no
relation to the applicant's actual perspective. In terms of racial and ethnic
diversity being a "plus" factor, the question becomes what specific
44 Id. at 375-76.
45 Adam Litpak, Supreme Court Says Child's Rights Violated by Strip Search, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/us/politics/26scotus.html.
46 Id.
47 Bakke, supra note 7, at 317 (emphasis added).
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qualities, informed by race and ethnicity, does the individual possess that
will give her or him a different perspective from others in the class? The
applicant would address this question by providing information in the
application--e.g., in a personal statement, diversity statement, resume, or
addendum-that speaks to this contextual diversity concern. In other
words, it would be the applicant's responsibility to provide the necessary
context that would demonstrate why the self-identification is meaningful to
her or him by connecting identity with perspective. In my former
admissions role, I remember some applicants who did this quite well.4 8 For
example, a Native American student may focus on her connection to her
tribal nation and how this motivates her to become an advocate for her
community. Or a Vietnamese American student may highlight his
experience as a refugee feeling marginalized in a predominantly white
Southern community and how he learned to speak up for himself and the
people he cares about in this environment. Or a multiracial student may
discuss the complexity of her racial identity and how she often struggles
with the tension between the socially constructed nature of race and the real
life consequences of this construct. The examples can go on and on. With
these markers of meaning, the admissions reader can make better decisions
on how to craft a class that will maximize the educational benefits of
diversity. This is what a narrowly tailored admissions practice should look
like. Otherwise, without any evidence of the ways in which a particular
applicant's worldview has been shaped by the selected checkboxes, the
checkboxes themselves would not provide sufficient evidence of diversity
of perspective. They would just provide checks in boxes that the applicant
took a few seconds to fill in-limited information at best.
CONCLUSION
If an applicant fails to provide any contextual information regarding the
meaning of their optional racial self-identification, then a diversity "plus"
factor should not be given under the Grutter cases. The application should
be analyzed relying primarily on other admissions criteria-e.g., hard
factors such as standardized test scores, strength of prior curriculum, class
ranks, grades; and indicators of soft factors contained in resumes, letters of
recommendation, personal statements, and supplemental essays. However,
if the context is provided, then the application reader could use it, in
48 The following examples are by no means exhaustive, but merely illustrative of applicants who
told their personal narratives in a way that highlighted why the checked boxes were meaningful for
them.
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conjunction with the other criteria (i.e., in a holistic way), in making an
informed decision on how to craft an incoming class that includes different
perspectives that will benefit the whole class. This is how the Grutter
cases, and specifically the diversity "plus" factor, should apply to a
narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions process operating under the
educational benefits rationale. Mere checkbox diversity misses the point
that these cases were making about the educational benefits of diversity.
